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Hospital vulnerability to spread of respiratory infections: close contact data collection and mathematical modelling

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NOTE: This preprint reports new research that has not been certified by peer review and should not be used to guide clinical practice.

1 Abstract

2 The transmission risk of SARS-CoV-2 within hospitals can exceed that in the general community
3 because of more frequent close proximity interactions. However, epidemic risk across wards is still
4 poorly described. We measured CPIs directly using wearable sensors given to all those present in a
5 clinical ward over a 36-hour period, across 15 wards in three hospitals in spring 2020. Data were
6 collected from 2114 participants. These data were combined with a simple transmission model
7 describing the arrival of a single index case to the ward to estimate the risk of an outbreak. Estimated
8 epidemic risk ranged four-fold, from 0.12 secondary infections per day in an adult emergency to 0.49
9 per day in general paediatrics. The risk presented by an index case in a patient varied twenty-fold
10 across wards. Using simulation, we assessed the potential impact on outbreak risk of targeting the
11 most connected individuals for prevention. We found that targeting those with the highest
12 cumulative contact hours was most impactful (20% reduction for 5% of the population targeted), and
13 on average resources were better spent targeting patients. This study reveals patterns of interactions
14 between individuals in hospital during a pandemic and opens new routes for research into airborne
15 nosocomial risk.

16

17 Introduction

18 Hospitals are vulnerable to outbreaks of disease, which is especially important in a crisis such as the
19 COVID-19 pandemic. During the first pandemic wave in the UK, up to 16% of COVID-19 in-patients ¹
20 and 70% of staff ² had acquired their infection in hospital. In addition to the direct medical risks to
21 healthcare workers (HCW) and patients, infections among staff can lead to staff shortages and
22 disorganisation when they are ill or forced to isolate.

23 A key component of infection risk for an airborne infection is the rate of close contact between
24 individuals. This may be much higher in hospitals than in the general population, potentially leading
25 to elevated risk of transmission ³. Hence, anticipating the epidemic risk and prioritising prevention
26 measures requires an understanding of patterns of close contacts in these settings ⁴. These patterns
27 may vary widely depending on level of activity, specialty and organisation, and indeed the proportion
28 infected in SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks differed considerably between wards ^{1,5}.

29 Direct recording of close proximity interactions using wearable electronic sensors enables all
30 contacts to be recorded without inaccuracies in recall to which self-report methods are vulnerable ⁶.
31 A limited number of previous studies have used wearable sensor technology to study interactions in
32 hospitals. Some have relied on sensors worn only by HCWs, interacting with each other ⁷ or with
33 fixed-point sensors which interact with the sensors worn by HCWs ^{8,9}. Before the COVID-19
34 pandemic, studies using sensors worn by patients and HCWs have been conducted in paediatrics ¹⁰,
35 geriatrics ¹¹, acute care ¹² and long-term care ¹³.

36 This study was conducted to understand the threat of nosocomial infection during the pandemic
37 period, by measuring patterns of contact between individuals, predicting epidemic risk and
38 examining how to reduce it. The objectives were to collect detailed data on the frequency and
39 duration of contacts occurring between different types of individuals across a range of different
40 types of wards, and use this to predict epidemic risk using a simple transmission model. This would
41 then also allow us to evaluate prevention strategies which target the most connected individuals.

42

43 Results

44 Out of 2385 participants who were offered sensors, 98 (4%) refused to participate and a further 173
45 (7%) did not have their data recorded due to loss of their sensor. The final sample consisted of 2114
46 participants (89%), including 1320 HCW, 573 patients and 221 visitors, from whom 39 850 distinct
47 interactions were recorded. Further details on the participants are shown in Supplementary *Table S*
48 *2*. The contact information allowed reconstruction of the dynamic network of contact between all
49 individuals on the ward. The contact networks exhibit different characteristic patterns, including
50 some that are split between two separate centres, those where contacts are evenly distributed,
51 those where a dense centre of contacts is surrounded by a lighter connected ring, or where the
52 entire network is centralised around a hub of HCW (Figure 1).

53 Heterogeneity in contact patterns

54 Contact behaviour is highly heterogeneous, as shown by the distribution of numbers of unique
55 contacts and total contact time (Figure 2). On average, participants formed 6.7 contacts per day, with
56 ward-level averages ranging from 4.1 to 12.5. HCW contacts are widely distributed in terms of degree
57 while most patients have few contacts. However, in terms of total contact hours, the overall
58 distribution is dominated by HCWs and in particular nurses and physicians.

59 Average contact intensity for each status on each ward, and with every other status, is shown as a
60 contact matrix in Figure 3. Contact intensity among HCWs is relatively consistent between wards (on
61 average between 18 and 41 contact minutes per hour spent on the ward), with most HCW contacts
62 occurring with other HCWs, in every ward. In 8 of the studied wards including all the ICU wards and
63 adult emergency, patients also had the majority of their contacts with HCWs, while in the general
64 paediatrics and paediatric emergency wards they had most of their contact with visitors, and with
65 other patients in the remaining 5. The contact rates per hour are shown in Supplementary Figure S 2,

66 and the average duration of contact in Supplementary Figure S 3, which shows the long duration of
67 contacts, particularly between patients. The mean contact length was 30.3 minutes, but this varied
68 from 15.7 to 70.6 minutes between wards.

69 **Variety in epidemic risk**

70 These heterogenous contact patterns translated into heterogenous risks of an airborne pathogen
71 spreading within the wards. Figure 4 shows that the predicted overall number of secondary
72 infections per day varies 4-fold between the different wards, from 0.12 to 0.49, with the lowest
73 epidemic risk in the emergency wards and highest in general paediatrics. This variation between
74 wards is even more striking for secondary infections arising from an index case in a patient, with a
75 predicted range from 0.04 to 0.81. In emergency units (adult and paediatric), we estimate that
76 transmission between HCWs contributes almost all of the epidemic risk (Supplementary Figure S 4).
77 For other wards, risk of transmission from patients was highly variable. In geriatrics #1, the risk of
78 direct patient-to-patient transmission was particularly high, while in geriatrics #2 it was much lower, as
79 in this ward the cumulative contact time between patients was considerably lower (Figure 3).
80 In adult general wards, visitors presented low risk (up to 0.13 secondary infections per day). By
81 opposition estimated transmission risk from visitors could reach high levels in paediatric wards (up to
82 0.83 secondary infections per day in general paediatrics). The risk posed by HCWs was more
83 consistent between wards (0.13 to 0.35 secondary infections per day), with other HCWs being at
84 most risk in every ward.

85 **Simulating preventive interventions**

86 Figure 5 depicts the relative reduction in the epidemic risk obtained if the most connected 5% of the
87 population were given complete protection. The greatest effect came when targeting individuals
88 based on their contact hours (with a 22% reduction in secondary infections in the median ward),
89 while targeting by degree reduced infections by 13%, and selecting at random 10%. If only high-
90 contact patients were targeted, the reduction was similar (23%), whereas only 15% could be

91 achieved by targeting only high-contact HCWs. Much lower reductions were possible from visitors as
92 they always made up much less than 5% of the total population size.

93 We conducted two sensitivity analyses, the first of which was to examine the effect of changing the
94 proportion targeted over the range 0-20%. The size of the effect increased steadily with targeting,
95 with up to a 61% reduction achievable by targeting 20% of the population (Supplementary Figure S
96 6). Targeting by contact hours remained the most effective method throughout, but when targeting
97 20% of the population, it became as effective to target HCWs as patients.

98 Secondly, we explored the effect of changing the shape of the relationship between time in contact
99 and infection probability (Supplementary Figure S 5) by repeating the analysis with modified values
100 of the shape parameter α (Supplementary Figure S 7). While this does change the scale of the
101 reduction, it does not change the universal result that targeting by contact hours is the most
102 effective. Targeting all individuals or patients was also consistently better than targeting HCWs for all
103 values except the highest, $\alpha=0.5$, which corresponds to a 50% chance of transmission in 2.2 hours.

104 Discussion

105 This work reveals that the epidemic risk of an airborne pathogen, such as SARS-CoV-2, can vary
106 widely between clinical units due to heterogeneous patterns of contacts. We find that the risk
107 presented by a single index infection varies four-fold between wards. Emergency wards are on the
108 lower end because the time spent by patients and visitors on the wards was too short for them to be
109 able to transmit the virus to many others. The variation in risk rises to twenty-fold if the index case
110 was a patient, as in some wards e.g. geriatrics #1 the risk of patient-to-patient transmission was
111 particularly high, perhaps as a result of shared activities which are typical of long-term geriatric care.
112 Visits were generally not permitted during this period for adults, but higher risk coming from visitors
113 was notable in paediatric wards because visitors were expressly permitted in paediatric wards, as
114 visits were considered essential to children's medical prognosis.

115 The estimated number of secondary infections reached up to 0.8 infections per day, which
116 represents a basic reproduction number R_0 of 5.6 if we assume that the index case remains infectious
117 on the ward for 7 days¹⁴. The potential for high risk implies that mandatory mask-wearing to block
118 transmission, particularly from patients, is a valuable safety measure across all wards.

119 We examined how contact patterns could be exploited to improve prevention measures by better
120 targeting, which may be critical in a context of limited resources. Our model provides an estimation
121 of the maximum possible gain under the assumption that these measures are 100% effective,
122 analogous to fully protective contact precautions, or complete immunisation prior to contact. As
123 expected, targeting the most connected individuals had a disproportionate impact in reducing
124 secondary infections. However, our work provides additional insight on how these highly-connected
125 individuals may be selected. The biggest effect was achieved by targeting individuals by their relative
126 contact hours. When targeting a subset of the population, the greatest overall impact was achieved
127 by targeting patients, although the effect of targeting HCWs was more consistent. Targeting visitors
128 was generally less effective except in paediatric wards.

129 The current study is, to our knowledge, the only one to have used wearable sensors to sample from
130 all hospital users during the COVID-19 pandemic, and to have examined contact patterns across a
131 range of specialties. A study using the same type of wearable sensors, but in a rehabilitation hospital
132 and a pre-pandemic context, reported an average contact rate of 11.6 per day for all hospital users
133¹³. This estimate is higher than our own average estimate of 6.7 contacts per day, but our range of
134 ward level averages (4.1-12.5) overlaps with this.

135 In our estimates of epidemic risk, we used average patterns of contact between hospital users and
136 quantified only the risk of direct infection. While this does not take into account the dynamics of
137 ongoing transmission across a network¹⁵, we believe that our approach is more generalisable to the
138 acute-care hospital environment, which has a largely transient population and in which therefore the
139 connectivity between different parts of the network are less relevant.

140 Some limitations should be mentioned. First, the exact relationship between duration of contact and
141 probability of infection is unknown, and is likely to differ between different SARS-CoV-2 variants. A
142 saturating relationship between duration of exposure and infection risk has been identified, though
143 over a timescale of days and within households ¹⁶. We assumed 50% probability of transmission after
144 11 hours of contact, but explored modifying this between 2.2 and 110 hours, which did not change
145 our general conclusions.

146 Second, all types of recorded contacts were assumed to present equal risk, whereas this is likely to
147 differ by nature of contact (e.g. conversational or physical), and be mitigated by prevention measures
148 such as masks or hand hygiene, and vaccine-derived or natural immunity ¹⁷. Some care procedures
149 may require physical contact or for the patient to be unmasked, potentially elevating the risk of
150 patient to HCW transmission. However, since our results support the prioritisation of preventive
151 interventions on patients over HCWs, accounting for this asymmetry should only reinforce our
152 conclusions.

153 Finally, the simulations we have implemented are limited to direct short-range human-to-human
154 transmission and do not take into account for the risk of diffusion via air flows from physically
155 separated individuals within a clinical unit ^{18,19}. However, despite the risk of longer range
156 transmission for SARS-CoV-2, current evidence shows that droplet transmission during close
157 proximity interactions remains key for transmission ²⁰.

158 Beyond the illustration of its results for SARS-CoV-2, this work proposes a straightforward method
159 based on measurements of close proximity interaction to assess and compare basic risk of airborne
160 infection in clinical units. It allows the identification, among HCWs, patients and visitors, of those
161 whose contribution to the global risk is highest, in order to propose priority targets for control
162 measures. This work demonstrates the potential for combining contact monitoring and modelling to
163 minimise nosocomial epidemic risk, which may be applied both in crisis and less urgent contexts, and
164 adapted to other airborne bacterial or viral pathogens.

165 Methods

166 Data collection

167 The study was conducted in April-June 2020 in 15 wards in university hospital centres in Paris, Lyon
168 and Bordeaux, selected for their diversity of clinical activity (details in Supplementary Table S 1). Each
169 ward was studied for approximately 36 hours, starting with the nurses' day shift in the morning of
170 day 1 and finishing at the end of the day shift on day 2. All individuals initially present in the ward
171 were offered sensors, as were all subsequent arrivals to the ward. At the end of the study period or
172 on the participant's departure, the sensor was returned. The age and function (patient, visitor, or
173 type of health professional) of the individual was recorded, as well as the time period within which
174 the sensor was carried. The wearable sensors (shown in Supplementary Figure S 1) recorded the
175 identity of all other sensors within a range of about 1.5m every 10 seconds. Participants either kept
176 the sensor in a pocket or on a pendant around the neck. For patients assigned to their room (COVID-
177 19 patients, intensive care patients or neonates), they were hung on a fixed part of their bed.

178 Contact analysis

179 The first step in the data analysis was to calculate summary statistics of contact, for each individual
180 and then at the ward level between hospital users of different status (patient, visitor or HCW). The
181 contact matrices summarise the amount of contact between each status of individual (patient, visitor
182 and HCW) for each ward. The contact intensity and contact rate per hour, and the average duration
183 of each contact, were calculated for individuals of status y with those of status x .

184 Contact intensity was calculated for each individual as the total recorded cumulative contact minutes
185 divided by the number of hours that individual spent carrying the sensor. The contact intensity k_{xy} is
186 the total cumulative time an individual of status x spent in contact with individuals of status y per
187 hour on the ward, and is calculated as in Equation [1] where n_x is the number of individuals of
188 status x on the ward, i is an individual of status x , t_i is the number of hours this individual spent

189 carrying the sensor, j is an individual of status y , C_{iy} is the number of unique individuals of status y
190 contacted by i , and d_{ij} is the total duration of their contact over the study period.

$$191 \quad k_{xy} = \frac{1}{n_x} \sum_i^{n_x} \frac{1}{t_i} \sum_j^{C_{iy}} d_{ij}$$

192 [1]

193 Similarly, individual contact rate was the number of unique persons contacted by that individual, per
194 hour carrying the sensor. Average contact rate per hour c_{xy} for individuals of status x with those of
195 status y , is calculated by Equation [2], as the number of unique contacts of status y for individual i
196 divided by their time with the sensor t_i , and averaged over all individuals i of status x .

$$197 \quad c_{xy} = \frac{1}{n_x} \sum_i^{n_x} \frac{C_{iy}}{t_i}$$

198 [2]

199 Individual average contact duration was the total cumulative contact minutes divided by the number
200 of persons contacted. The average duration of a contact that status x has with status y , d_{xy} , is
201 calculated as in Equation [3] by first taking the average duration of all contacts an individual i of
202 status x has with individuals j of status y , divided by all individuals of that status contacted, C_{iy} . The
203 average of this value is then taken across all individuals i of status x .

$$204 \quad d_{xy} = \frac{1}{n_x} \sum_i^{n_x} \frac{1}{C_{iy}} \sum_j^{C_{iy}} d_{ij}$$

205 [3]

206 The mean of each of these measures (contact rate, contact intensity and contact duration) was then
207 calculated for each ward and between each combination of status and provided in contact matrices.

208 Epidemic risk

209 To examine how these ward-level values translate to epidemic risk, we wrote a transmission model
210 to predict the number of secondary infections which would occur per day from a hypothetical SARS-
211 CoV-2 index case if all contacts were susceptible. For each ward, we calculated the total number of
212 expected contacts per day from the average contact rate per hour, \bar{c} (Equation [4]) in which n is the
213 total number present, C_i is the total number of contacts for individual i .

$$214 \quad \bar{c} = \frac{1}{n} \cdot \sum_i^n \frac{C_i}{t_i}$$

215 [4]

216 We also calculated the average time spent on the ward per 24-hour period, \bar{H} (Equation [5]), using
217 their time carrying the sensor as a proxy, and where T is the total duration of the study on that ward.

$$218 \quad \bar{H} = \frac{24}{n \cdot T} \sum_i^n t_i$$

219 [5]

220 We assumed that the probability of infection per contact increased with duration of contact, and
221 with a diminishing increase for longer contacts²¹. The overall probability of infection per contact, $\overline{p_{\text{inf}}}$
222 (Equation [6]), was calculated from the mean probability of infection per contact for each individual
223 i across all of their contacts j , where the probability of infection between two individuals (Equation [
224 7]) is determined by the duration of contact d_{ij} and a shape parameter a , for which higher values
225 are associated with a steeper increase of infection probability as contact duration increases
226 (Supplementary Figure S 5). For the baseline analysis, a value of $a = 0.1$ is used, representing a 50%
227 probability of infection after 11 hours in contact.

228
$$\bar{p}_{\text{inf}} = \frac{1}{n} \cdot \sum_i^n \frac{1}{C_i} \cdot \sum_j^{C_i} p_{\text{inf}ij}$$

229 [6]

230
$$p_{\text{inf}ij} = \frac{1 - e^{-d_{ij} \cdot a}}{1 + e^{-d_{ij} \cdot a}}$$

231 [7]

232 The expected number of secondary infections per day, M , was then computed as the product of
233 these three quantities (Equation [8]):

234
$$M = \bar{c} \cdot \bar{H} \cdot \bar{p}_{\text{inf}}$$

235 [8]

236 Specific predictions of numbers of secondary infections per day between different status of hospital
237 user (patients, visitors and HCWs) were calculated using the same approach. The number of
238 secondary infections from an index infection of status x towards individuals of status y is predicted as
239 M_{xy} (Equation [9]).

240
$$M_{xy} = c_{xy} \cdot H_x \cdot p_{\text{inf}xy}$$

241 [9]

242 where c_{xy} is the contact rate per hour between x and y (Equation [2]), $p_{\text{inf}xy}$ is the probability of
243 infection in contacts between x and y (Equation [10]), using $p_{\text{inf}ij}$ from Equation [7], and H_x is the
244 average time spent on the ward by individuals of status x (Equation [11]).

245
$$p_{\text{inf}xy} = \frac{1}{n_x} \cdot \sum_i^{n_x} \frac{1}{C_{iy}} \cdot \sum_j^{C_{iy}} p_{\text{inf}ij}$$

246 [10]

247
$$H_x = \frac{24}{n_x \cdot T} \sum_i^{n_x} t_i$$

248 [11]

249 Finally, the overall number of secondary infections from an index case of status x to any status of
250 individual is calculated by summing M_{xy} over all status y (Equation [12]).

251
$$M_x = \sum_y M_{xy}$$

252 [12]

253 Simulated interventions

254 We used this model to predict the effect of control measures targeting the most connected
255 individuals by repeating this calculation of epidemic risk, M , but with the highest risk individuals
256 being neither susceptible nor capable of transmitting. We selected the 5% of the population with
257 either the most unique contacts over the whole study period, or the highest cumulative contact
258 hours. The probability of infection from or to these individuals was set to zero. We also evaluated the
259 targeting of only individuals of a single status, e.g. highly connected patients, ensuring for
260 comparability that the number targeted still made up 5% of the total population. The reduction in
261 daily risk was calculated as a proportion of the baseline risk in which nobody was targeted (Equation
262 [13]).

263
$$\text{Relative reduction} = \frac{M_{\text{baseline}} - M_{\text{targeted}}}{M_{\text{baseline}}}$$

264 [13]

265 We tested the sensitivity of the simulation analysis to the proportion of the population targeted
266 (over the range 0%-20%) and the shape parameter α which drives the increase in the infection
267 probability for longer contacts (over the range 0.05-0.5).

268 All analyses were conducted using *R 4.2.0*²², with network analyses conducted using *igraph*, and
269 graphics produced using *ggplot2*. The code used for each analysis and visualisation is available at
270 https://github.com/georghirreff/nodscov2_risksim.

271 Ethics approval and consent to participate

272 This research was approved by the Comités de protection des personnes (CPP) Ile-de-France VI on
273 14/04/2020 and the Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertés (CNIL) on 16/04/2020.
274 Signed consent by patients, medical and administrative staff, and visitors was not required according
275 to the CPP and CNIL, but participants could refuse to participate. When patients were minors, unable
276 to refuse or under guardianship, parents, family or guardians, respectively, were asked. The study
277 was carried out in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.

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329

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350 Study conception by DG, BTH, LO, LT; data collection supervised by BTH, DG; data collection
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
356 [Data availability](#)

357 All code used for analysis and visualization is available at
358 https://github.com/georghirreff/nodscov2_risksim along with a subset of the
359 data.

360 [Competing interests](#)

361 The authors declare no competing interests.


362 Figures



363


364 *Figure 1. Representations of contact networks within a ward. Each individual is a node and*
 365 *each link a contact, regardless of duration. Each row represents a different characteristic*
 366 *network shape, as indicated by the labels on the left. The numbers present of each status are*
 367 *given in the subtitle.*

368



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
370 **Figure 2. Connectivity of all status and functions of individuals across all wards. The depth**
 371 **of the violin represents the frequency of that value, and the total volume of each violin is**
 372 **equal. The orange point indicates the median of the distribution.**



373

374 **Figure 3. Contact intensity between statuses of individuals on each ward. Each panel**
 375 **represents a ward, and each cell represents the total cumulative contact minutes that each**
 376 **type of individual (patient, visitor or HCW, columns) has with each type of individual (rows)**
 377 **per hour spent carrying the sensor. Where the type of individual is not present, the**
 378 **corresponding column is grey.**


379



380

381 *Figure 4. Predicted number of secondary infections per day from a single index case. Each*
 382 *panel represents a different hypothetical index infection, and the coloured bars represent the*
 383 *number of individuals of each status expected to be directly infected per day. The boxplots on*
 384 *the right illustrate the range of values in each bar plot.*

385



386

387 **Figure 5. The percentage reduction in number of secondary infections per day per infected**
 388 **individual, when the most connected 5% of the population are completely protected. In**
 389 **each panel, the 5% are taken only from the indicated group. The x-axis indicates the method**
 390 **by which connectivity is measured for targeting. Each point represents a single ward, and the**
 391 **horizontal red line represents the median across all wards.**

392

393

394 [List of abbreviations](#)

395 CNIL Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertés

396 COVID-19 Coronavirus Disease 19

397 CPP Comités de protection des personnes

398 HCW, HCWs Healthcare worker, healthcare workers

399 SARS-CoV-2 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2

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